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DO UK MPS ENGAGE MORE WITH SELECT COMMITTEES SINCE THE WRIGHT 
REFORMS?: AN INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS, 1979-2016 
 
Abstract 
The 2010 Wright Reforms are the most significant changes to the Select Committee system in the 
UK House of Commons since their inauguration in their modern form in 1979. We use interrupted 
time series techniques (ARIMA) to test the impact of the Wright Report on the level of 
parliamentarians’ engagement with those Select Committees covered by the Wright Reforms using 
proxy measures of membership attendance and turnover rates. We find little or no evidence that the 
Wright Report had an impact on these outcomes. In light of these findings, we argue that some of 
the claims made regarding the successes of Select Committees and the Wright Reforms are 
overblown or, at least, premature and inadequately supported by evidence, and that further reforms 
may be needed if the aims of the Wright Committee are to be realised more fully. 
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DO UK MPS ENGAGE MORE WITH SELECT COMMITTEES SINCE THE WRIGHT 
REFORMS?: AN INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS, 1979-2016 
 
The introduction of the modern House of Commons Select Committee system in 1979 is regarded 
as one of the most successful episodes in recent Parliamentary reform. Though Select Committees 
(henceforth SCs) have relatively limited powers in contrast to committees in many other legislatures, 
they have received “universal praise” according to the Wright Committee on Reform of the House 
(2009, p.8). Since undergoing further reform in 2010 as a result of the recommendations of the 
Wright Committee, SCs have gained a higher profile and, many claim, have become even more 
assertive and effective, to the extent that the ‘Wright reforms’ have been described as ‘the most 
significant change to the way that the House operates in 30 years’ (Hagelund and Goddard 2015). 
The Speaker of the House of Commons described SCs as “pivotal players” in politics as a result of 
the Wright reforms; Ian Marsh describes SCs as a “newly emboldened” and “empowered system” 
(2016, p.96); BBC Parliamentary correspondent Mark d’Arcy described the post-Wright SC system 
as “more powerful and independent-minded than ever before” (BBC News 2011) and the Liaison 
Committee’s principal conclusions in their 2015 Legacy Report were: 
a) The Wright reforms have worked and should be retained and developed...  
b) Public opinion, commentators and academic critics have all recognised that select 
committee work is the most constructive and productive aspect of Parliament (2015, p.40). 
In this article, we address two problems with these widespread, albeit not entirely uncontested 
assessments of SCs’ performance. First, there are major methodological difficulties in assessing the 
influence, impact or power of Parliament, as Russell and Benton (2011) and Judge (1993) among 
others note. This should temper any sweeping conclusions about the efficacy or otherwise of the SC 
system. Second, the data on which these assessments are based is limited, particularly as regards 
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quantitative data. This is highly significant since the methods used to support evaluations of the 
Wright reforms are often incomplete, unsystematic, impressionistic or potentially biased. This is 
especially problematic where the main source of information is interview data gathered from those 
most closely involved with the SC system and with the greatest vested interest in its being regarded 
as effective. While academic studies by O’Brien (2012), Fisher (2015), Marsh (2016), Rogers and 
Walters (2015), White (2015) and Russell and Benton (2011; 2013), and Parliament’s own many 
reviews of the system including most recently that by the Liaison Committee (2015) have 
contributed greatly to the understanding and assessment of the SC system , the reservations raised 
by Hindmoor et al. (2009) in their paper on the pre-Wright system remain valid. Writing in 2009, the 
authors claimed that:  
 Within both official reports and the extant academic literature, arguments about 
the influence of committees are supported through the inclusion of positive 
endorsements from seasoned outside observers, past or present committee 
members and, for illustrative purposes, lists of the occasions on which committee 
recommendations are claimed to have resulted in policy changes. (Hindmoor, 
Larkin et al. 2009, 73)1  
We would further add that the degree to which existing reviews systematically compare the pre- and 
post- Wright systems is quite limited (pace O’Brien (2012)). In order to help address these two 
problems, we use interrupted time series techniques (autoregressive integrated moving average 
(ARIMA) models) to analyse a dataset of SC membership between 1979 and 2016 in order to 
examine the evidence for transformative change in the level of parliamentarians’ engagement with 
                                                          
1 This latter point has been addressed since the authors wrote by, for example, Russell and Benton (2011; 2013) who 
apply systematic quantitative analysis of committee impact on legislation supported by in-depth qualitative material.  
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SCs subsequent to the implementation of the Wright reforms through the use of two proxy 
variables: SC membership attendance and turnover rates. The paper also assesses the 
implementation in practice of a key recommendation of the Wright Committee regarding the 
number of SCs. The overall hypothesis most commonly presented in the extant literature is that 
post-Wright SCs have become more important and effective institutions. We would expect to see 
this improvement in status reflected in a greater engagement and involvement of parliamentarians 
with SC work. As the status of post-Wright SC work increases, we anticipate higher rates of 
attendance as MPs see greater value in committee work, and lower turnover as MPs increasingly 
choose to extend their period of service on committees in preference to, for example, pursuing 
promotion into the lower ranks of government, or focusing on constituency work. The Wright 
Committee’s own report expressly defined increasing parliamentarians’ engagement as measured by 
attendance as one of its objectives to invigorate SCs and implicitly defined lowering membership 
turnover as an aim. As such, the paper measures the Wright reforms against the committee’s own 
success criteria, and also seeks evidence of increased engagement by MPs with committees to 
support or challenge claims made about the impact of Wright by existing academic, journalistic and 
practitioner evaluations. We find that, while the Wright reforms may have been a valuable exercise in 
many respects, there is no evidence thus far of even minor changes in the level of engagement by 
MPs with SCs subsequent to the reforms. 
 
The article has seven further sections. In the first, we outline the role, reputation and reform of SCs. 
In the second, we discuss existing work on the impact of the Wright Reforms before setting out 
details of the data and methods for our analysis in the third and fourth sections respectively. The 
results are presented in the fifth section before a discussion of the results for our understanding of 
the impact of the Wright Reforms and a short conclusion. 
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I. Select Committees in the UK Parliament 
SCs have become the principal vehicle in the UK Parliament for oversight and scrutiny of 
government departments. Yet their powers relative to committees in some other legislatures (not 
least the Scottish and Welsh devolved institutions) remain limited, particularly in the realm of policy-
making and legislation. Although recently committees have expanded their range of activities to 
include more legislative work, the majority of their activity is still based on executive oversight. 
Despite this, they remain perhaps the one area of parliamentary activity that draws near-‘universal 
praise’ whether from parliamentarians, media or academic commentators. Some typical examples of 
this praise are described in the opening sections of this paper, illustrating the degree to which SCs 
are regarded as Parliament “at its best”.  The most senior official of the House of Commons 
(henceforth HoC), for example, noted that “SCs seem to be held in generally high regard – perhaps 
more than anything else that Parliament does” (Rogers and Walters 2015, p.325). 
  
A number of reports and reviews initiated by Parliament over the years have also given the 
Commons SC system a positive evaluation. A review by the Liaison Committee (composed of the 
Chairs of the main SCs) in 2000 claimed:  
The 1979 Select Committee system has been a success. We have no doubt of 
that. At a bargain price, it has provided independent scrutiny of government. 
It has enabled the questioning of Ministers and civil servants, and has forced 
them to explain policies (paragraph 4). 
A review by the Modernisation Committee in 2002 found that SCs have: 
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served Parliament well… they have enabled MPs to hold the executive to 
account through more rigorous scrutiny than is possible on the floor of 
the House (paragraph 59) . 
SCs were seen to have contributed to both of Parliament’s key roles in scrutinising government as a 
‘source of unbiased information, rational debate, and constructive ideas’ and in representing the 
public; the reformed committees were also found to have ‘made the political process less remote, 
and more accessible to the citizen who is affected by that process’ (Liaison Committee 2000, 
paragraph 4).  
 
Perhaps counter-intuitively, the generally positive assessment of the performance of the SC system 
over the years has been accompanied by a series of attempts at reform. The main remaining 
weakness in the system was often seen as the control of Whips over the appointment of SC 
members, which meant that government retained influence over the bodies charged with its own 
scrutiny. In the wake of the 2009 MPs’ expenses scandal, parliamentarians seized an opportunity to 
make important changes to the scrutiny and accountability functions of Parliament, and in particular 
to the functions of SCs. An ad hoc committee on reform of the HoC was convened, chaired by the 
then chair of the Public Administration SC, Tony Wright, to develop proposals for parliamentary 
reform. The Committee made a number of recommendations that sought to strengthen the HoC in 
its engagements with government, including, as discussed in detail below, a series of reforms to the 
operation of SCs, particularly in terms of membership selection2.  
 
                                                          
2 Other reforms recommended by the Wright Committee included changes to control and timings of HoC business and 
efforts to enhance public involvement in Parliament. For more on the background and content of the Wright Reforms, 
see Russell (2011) and Wright (2014). 
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Since the Wright Reforms in 2010, praise for SCs, at least in some prominent quarters, has increased 
further, with media and academic commentaries on Parliament identifying greater assertiveness and 
effectiveness in SC work. SCs have played a prominent role in several major public policy episodes 
since the 2010 election, including the phone-hacking scandal (May 2015), tax evasion by 
multinational companies (O'Brien 2012) and banking and financial services reform. The work of SCs 
has become more frequently featured in the media (Kubala 2011), and some committee chairs have 
acquired an independent media profile. This led one committee chair to claim that the 2010-2015 
Parliament would be remembered as ‘the Parliament of the Select Committee’ (Sir Richard Ottaway, 
former Chair of Foreign Affairs SC, cited in Fisher 2015, p.419). Reforms made by the Wright 
committee have been cited as the main reason for this by the Parliamentary and Constitutional 
Reform SC (2013), and by the Speaker of the House, among others. The Speaker said that the 
reforms have:  
had a transformational impact on the authority and from there the ambitions of Select 
Committees. Their independence has been entrenched and their horizons broadened… They 
are pivotal players in politics. So much outstanding work have they done in scrutinising 
across the field of public policy that I am spoilt for choice in citing examples of it 
(Parliamentary and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2013). 
There is arguably a narrative becoming established through parliamentary, media and academic 
sources that SCs are Parliament at its best, that the Wright reforms have improved SCs further and 
as a consequence, improved Parliament. SC chairs themselves have praised the new system, noting 
that committee work and particularly chairing, now presents a viable alternative career path for 
parliamentarians other than seeking ministerial office (a view endorsed by others; see, for example 
Fisher (2015) and Le Roux (2014)). One committee chair (and ex-minister) has claimed that some 
committee chairs were becoming more significant political players than cabinet ministers (May 
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2015). One of the few rigorous quantitative studies on the subject also claims that the new system of 
selecting members has improved SCs’ gender balance and favoured the election of female Chairs 
(O'Brien 2012). 
 
This emerging consensus on the effectiveness of the present system is politically consequential since 
it impacts on discussions about present and future proposals for parliamentary reform. Such is the 
esteem in which SCs are currently held that their resources have been increased significantly with a 
20% increase in staffing and the creation of a supporting Scrutiny Unit in 2002-2003 (Le Roux 
2014). Moreover, some people have continued to advocate for even greater resources to be devoted 
to them (Korris 2011) with one prominent think-tank suggesting transferring the legislative work 
currently conducted by Public Bill Committees to the SCs, a process that would represent an even 
greater transformation of the committee system than either the 1979 or 2010 changes (Hagelund and 
Goddard 2015; White 2015). Similar proposals to greatly enhance the role of SCs have also been 
endorsed by Robert Rogers, the former Clerk of the HoC, as a means of boosting the power of 
Parliament by playing to its ‘acknowledged strengths’ in the SC system (2015, pp.375-6).  
 
2. Measuring the impact of the Wright reforms 
As demonstrated above, the most widely-held belief about SCs is that they are generally effective 
and that they have grown in stature since 2010. More recently, a number of studies have emerged 
that are more nuanced in their assessment of the performance of SCs, acknowledging some 
improvements in performance and profile but also identifying areas of weakness and the difficulties 
of measuring impact and effectiveness (Brazier and Fox 2011; White 2015). Tyler (2011) also 
cautions against uncritical praise for the reformed system, noting that the changes to membership 
election may be limited in their impact due to the absence of competition for places and the swollen 
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payroll vote in Parliament. This caution about committee effectiveness should be reinforced by the 
fact that the quality of data available to academics to support evaluation of these claims is limited. As 
Hindmoor, Larkin and Kennon have noted in their study of the Education SC “The evidence used 
to support expressions of this argument is… largely anecdotal.” (2009). Benton and Russell have 
also remarked on the lack of robust evidence to support claims about SC efficacy, which they claim 
are often “made in a virtual vacuum in terms of evidence” (2013).  
 
These scholars have produced work that has made significant progress in establishing an evidential 
basis for the assessment of SC performance. Hindmoor et al.’s study of the Education SC (2009), 
and Russell and Benton’s more comprehensive study of a range of Committees over time (2011; 
2013), have produced robust analyses of committee impact – understood as the effect of committee 
work on government legislative proposals – through tracking committee recommendations into 
subsequent legislation (see also Shephard and Cairney (2011) on committees in the Scottish 
Parliament) .  
 
Yet as these scholars note, impact on government legislation represents only one dimension of the 
work of SCs, and so despite these advances, the picture remains incomplete. This article represents 
an attempt to further develop the quantitative evidence base for understanding and evaluating SCs, 
focusing on the 2010 reforms to SCs and their membership. In particular, we focus on two key sets 
of proposals of the Wright Committee for raising the status and quality of committee work and the 
appeal of committees to MPs: (i) changes to the process for selecting members of committees; and 
(ii) rationalising the SC system in terms of both the number of committees and their size. Thus, we 
do not assess committee impact as with these earlier studies, but instead focus on MPs engagement 
and involvement with SCs since the reforms.  
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The Wright Committee clearly sought to raise the profile of SC work both within and outside 
Parliament, and to encourage members to attend and actively participate in committee work (House 
of Commons Reform Committee 2009, p.5). To these ends, the Committee recommends: 
[A]n initial system of election by the whole House of Chairs of departmental and similar 
SCs, and thereafter the election by secret ballot of members of those committees by each 
political party, according to their level of representation in the House, and using transparent 
and democratic means…  
 
[T]hat the new House of Commons reduce the size of its standard departmental committees 
to not more than 11; Members in individual cases can be added to specific committees to 
accommodate the legitimate demands of the smaller parties... We believe there should be 
clear consequences for unreasonable absence from Select Committees. The House must also 
seek to reduce the numbers of committees, ending overlapping or duplicate remits and 
rationing the scarce resource of Members time and commitment (2009, pp.84-5; see also 
Chapter 3)3. 
 
The Government of the time responded to these recommendations in a Written Ministerial 
Statement (Leader of the House, 9 January 2010) and, after a full day’s debate and two series of 
votes on 22 Feburary and 4 March 2010, the House, according to the Wright Committee, took 
‘significant and welcome steps… on the path to reform’ (2010, pp.5-6). These steps included 
introducing or modifying Standing Orders in order to allow for the election of chairs (by the whole 
                                                          
3 Another recommendation, that of electing the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, only deals with a 
specific committee and is not dealt with here. 
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House) and members (by party caucuses) of particular SCs, standardizing the size of departmental 
SCs at 11 (with the exception of the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee which retained 13 
members), ensuring that the nomination of SC members would take place within six weeks of the 
beginning of the session in a new Parliament, and introducing a mechanism ‘permitting the Speaker 
to invite the Committee of Selection to discharge and replace a SC member whose attendance had 
fallen below a given threshold over a session’ (House of Commons Reform Committee, 2009, pp.5-
6 & 15); this threshold subsequently being set at 60% (Liaison Committee 2013, p.5). 
 
Below, we analyse the impact of the Wright Report in two stages. First, as a preliminary to the study 
of MPs engagement with SCs, we investigate whether one other key recommendation – a reduction 
in the number of committees – was implemented in practice. The then Government were silent on 
this issue (Maer 2010, p.26) and no changes to Standing Orders were made at the time, including to 
the Order that stipulates that each government department should have a corresponding SC. 
However, both Governments and the HoC have at least some scope to limit the number of SCs, 
especially non-departmental SCs, and/or merge remits. For example, in 2015, the Conservative 
Government somewhat-controversially abolished the Political & Constitutional Reform Committee 
and merged its remit with the Public Administration Committee. Moreover, SCs themselves are 
customarily given the power to appoint sub-committees (Griffith et al. 2002 p.799). Thus, we test 
whether the Wright Reforms had an impact on: (i) the number of Domestic/Administrative and 
Other Scrutiny SCs (i.e. non-departmental SCs); and (ii) the number of sub-committees. 
 
Second, we test the effectiveness of the interventions surrounding elections, committee size and 
attendance monitoring as a way of invigorating SCs and making the HoC a more vital institution, 
central goals of the Wright Committee. Here, we examine membership variables relating to 
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parliamentarians’ engagement with Select Committees using attendance rates and membership 
turnover as proxies. An increase in attendance rates4 and a decrease in turnover rates were 
respectively explicit and implicit aims of the Wright Committee in its desire to boost the SC system 
and the vitality of Parliament, as can be seen from its statement:  
We have proposed smaller committees and thus greater competition for places on them 
among Members which we hope will in turn generate a greater sense of ownership and will 
lead to higher levels of attendance and participation (2009 p.29). 
Moreover, with regard attendance, the move from the system of appointments to that of elections 
was proposed, in part, to enhance the Members’ sense of duty to attend meetings (2009 p.24); and, 
with regard turnover, the Wright Committee spoke of the need to incentivise (2009 p.19) and 
increase the commitment of SC members, and highlighted the view that it is “crucial to create a 
parliamentary career path focussed on select committee work” (2009 p.11). High turnover would 
suggest that MPs are not using committees to specialise and develop policy expertise, to pursue an 
explicitly parliamentary (rather than governmental or constituency-focused) orientation in their 
work, or to build a scrutiny-based parliamentary career. Consequently, we hypothesise that reforms 
to SCs introduced in response to the Wright Committee report that sought to increase the prestige, 
importance and effectiveness of committee work ought to lead to: 
i. An increase in membership attendance rates of SCs affected by the Wright Reforms; 
ii. A decrease in membership turnover rates of SCs affected by the Wright Reforms. 
 
3. Data 
                                                          
4 SC attendance had long been a concern of Parliament with the introduction of individual attendance rates in the 
2007/08 Sessional Return being in response to perceived low attendance among some Members (private 
correspondence with SC Clerk). 
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The data was collected from the HoC Sessional Returns or, before 1986-87, SCs Returns for each 
parliamentary session between 1979-80 and 2015-16 inclusive, thus covering 36 parliamentary 
sessions, nine parliaments and four changes of government. Sessional Returns are official HoC 
publications that provide information about the HoC and its Committees5.  
 
Collecting this information produced a dataset which covered 256 different committees and 
contained 19,518 discrete data points. This dataset was then combined with another which recorded 
the party, gender, constituency, and other personal information of every MP who has sat in the HoC 
post-1979. This dataset was the main focus with regard to the number of committees. With regard 
attendance and turnover, the main foci were on two sub-datasets: (i) all SCs affected by the Wright 
Reforms (n=53) and their members over the period 1979 to 2016 (n=9,767); and (ii) all 
departmental SCs (n=40) and their members over the same period (n=7,749). For number, we look 
at the two main types of non-departmental full SCs – Domestic/Administrative and Other Scrutiny 
(henceforth DAOS) – and the overall number of sub-Committees; for turnover, the focus is on all 
SCs affected by the reforms6. With regard to attendance, we ideally wanted to focus on all 
                                                          
5 The data collected in the Sessional Returns is not consistent over time. For the purpose of the present analysis, there 
were two consequential limitations of the data. First, information about attendance rates for the Committee as a whole 
was only included from 1985-86 onwards. Second, individual attendance rates were only recorded systematically between 
2007-08 and 2014-15. Before 2007-08, it was only possible to calculate individual attendance rates for those members 
who sat on the Committee for the whole session and were not added and/or discharged partway through the session; 
for 2015-16 it was only possible to calculate individual attendance rates for those committees who published the data. 
6
 In addition to all departmental SCs, the other committees included in this time-series are: Environmental Audit; 
Procedure; Public Accounts; Public Administration & Constitutional Affairs (and forerunners); and Standards (and 
forerunners). Although affected by the reforms, the Backbench Business and Petitions Committees are not included 
because they did not exist before the 2010 election and, thus, no interrupted time-series analysis could occur. 
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committees affected by the reforms. However, because of methodological issues regarding how the 
data was recorded in earlier Returns7 and the different sizes of affected non-departmental SCs (for 
example, the Public Accounts Committee has 15 members), we concentrate here at the aggregate 
level on departmental SCs. 
 
4. Method: interrupted time-series analysis 
For our study we can represent the Wright reforms as constituting an interrupted time series (or 
intervention). A statistical approach known as autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) 
models are well-suited to model the effect of the Wright Reforms on the engagement of members of 
departmental SCs because they analyse the impact of an intervention – in this case, the introduction 
of the Wright Reforms – on a time series when it is potentially the case that previous years’ outcome 
have an effect on the current outcome8.  
 
The dependent variables for the four different elements of this study were: (i) number of DAOS 
committees; (ii) number of sub-committees9; (iii) weighted turnover rate of membership10; and (iv) 
                                                          
7 See footnote 5. 
8
 We did not include a non-equivalent control group element because, with the possible exception of the European 
Scrutiny Committee, there is not enough overlap between Wright and non-Wright Committees – in terms of their remit, 
the frequency of meetings, and the number of inquiries, etc. – for meaningful comparisons. Thanks to Richard Kelly for 
discussions on this point.  
9 Sub-Committees can be relatively long-standing, such as the Treasury Sub-Committee or the Sub-Committee on the 
work of the Independent Commission for Aid Impact, or ad hoc, appointed to address a particular issue, such as the 
Badgers & Cattle Tuberculosis Sub-Committee. Both types are included here. 
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membership attendance rate. The ARIMA model for each outcome looks at the effect of time, 
changes in the intercept, and changes in the slope, relevant to when the intervention took place.  
 
For analysis of the number of SCs and turnover of Wright Committees’ membership, the time series 
we used started with the 1979-80 session and ended with 2015-16; for analysis of the attendance rate 
of members, the time series ended at the same point but started with the 1985-86 session11.  
 
There are three basic steps involved in producing a model to assess the causal impact of an 
intervention on a time series when using ARIMA techniques (Pridemore et al. 2007, p.279): 
1. A ‘prewhitening’ procedure occurs in which the dependent series – in this case, each series 
of the four different elements of our study outlined above – undergo a white noise process. 
This process entails transforming the dependent series into a new set of observations that 
are distributed independently and normally with a mean of zero and a constant variance. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 Turnover was weighted in order to take into account the length of parliamentary sessions. For example, the 
unweighted turnover rate for the 2010-12 session was 38.8% and quite clearly the highest of the Parliament. However, 
the 2010-12 session, at 295 days, was more than twice as long as any other session in the Parliament. Once weighted, the 
turnover score of 48.0 for 2010-12 was the second highest of the Parliament. Weighting was calculated by dividing the 
turnover rate by the length in days of the parliamentary session and multiplying the answer by 365 to give an annualised 
score. 
11
 See Footnote 5. The lengths of the two time series (36 and 30 observations respectively) are sometimes viewed as 
shorter than optimal (see, for example, Box, Jenkins & Reinsel, 1994). However, our dataset comprises all the data 
available and is therefore the most comprehensive that is capable of being assembled. Morever, as Pridemore et al. argue 
“It should be recognized that analysts are often faced with the dilemma of analyzing relatively short time series or using 
less appropriate cross-sectional data to study dynamic social processes” (2007), and, as William et al. (2002) note, the 
exact number of observations cannot be fully specified beforehand and, statistically, the number of observations can be 
regarded as adequate if they are sufficient to identify the model. 
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2. An appropriate transfer function is chosen to estimate the impact of the intervention – here, 
the introduction of the Wright Reforms – on the prewhitened dependent series. 
3. A number of diagnostic checks are run on the final model. If the model is considered 
inadequate, a new model is estimated. This process occurs until a statistically adequate model 
is constructed. 
As with all interrupted time-series analyses, our causal hypothesis was that observations after the 
intervention (i.e. after the introduction of the Wright Reforms) will have a different intercept and/or 
slope, albeit possibly temporarily, from those before the intervention. The effect, if any, of the 
Wright Reforms can be determined empirically by testing for three common patterns, relating to 
changes in the intercept and/or slope, each determined by a different functional form (McDowell et 
al. 1980, pp.64-83): 
1. An abrupt, permanent impact;   
2. A gradual, permanent impact;   
3. An abrupt, temporary impact.  
 
5. Results 
The scatterplots for the time series relating to the number of DAOS and sub-SCs, the attendance 
rates of departmental SCs, and the weighted membership turnover rates of SCs affected by the 
Wright Reforms, as well as a vertical line which indicates the pre- and post-intervention periods, are 
presented in Figures 1-4 respectively.  
 
FIGURES 1-3 HERE 
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With regard to the number and average attendance and turnover rates of committees there is quite 
limited evidence of any effects from the graphical evidence. To extend the modelling we include two 
additional independent variables – whether the session was at (i) the start or (ii) the end of a 
Parliament – in order to also model for the possible effects of parliamentary cycles and changes in 
government12. These additional independent variables were included following past research 
(Institute for Government 2015), which indicated that these two factors could be important in 
explaining changes in SCs and membership engagement. 
 
The model description and statistics for each of the time series are presented in Table 113, and the 
ARIMA model parameters for each time series are presented in Table 2.  
 
TABLES 1-2 HERE 
 
                                                          
12 The subsequent models are, in more technical terms, ARIMAX models (ARIMA plus exogenous covariates – transfer 
function model). 
13 The form of the ARIMA model employed to account for systematic variation, or autocorrelation, for the weighted 
turnover time series is the first-order, autoregressive model (1,0,0); for the other three time series, it is the differenced 
first-order autoregressive model (1,1,0). We followed Hyndman and Athanasopoulos (2014) and used the R ‘forecast’ 
package to investigate which series need to be differenced, and to what degree. Two common tests for unit roots and 
trend-stationarity are the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) respectively. 
Using the latter, we determined that the series related to number and attendance should be first-differenced but that 
turnover did not require differencing. The Q statistic is the outcome of the Ljung–Box test which considers whether any 
of a group of autocorrelations of a time series are different from zero. In terms of statistical adequacy, the models for 
the all time series clearly meet the diagnostic criterion in that none of the autocorrelation functions are significant at the 
.05 level.  
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The results from the interrupted time series analysis are clear: there is little or no evidence that the 
Wright Reforms had any impact. There were no independent variables that were statistically 
significant for the number of DOAS committees, or the total number of sub-committees. The 
independent variables that are statistically significant at least at the .05 level are: it being the start 
(p<.000) of a Parliament for the average attendance rate; and it being the start (p<.005), or the end 
(p<.009), of a Parliament for the weighted membership turnover. In relation to both these 
dependent variables, then, there is a clear parliamentary cycle (see Figures 2 & 3) with attendance at 
its highest at the beginning of a parliament and with weighted turnover tending to be lower at the 
beginning and end of a parliament14. The evidence we have collected so far, then, suggests that one 
of the key recommendations of the Wright Committee was not implemented and that the other 
post-Wright reforms had little, if any, meaningful impact on these measures of SC membership 
engagement, which were the explicit or implicit aims of the Committee. There is therefore no 
statistical evidence that MPs were more engaged or involved with committees post-Wright, despite 
the many claims made about their higher status and significance following the reforms. We discuss 
these findings in more detail below. 
 
                                                          
14 In relation to weighted turnover, our model is only able to explain just less than half the variability of the response 
data around its mean (R-squared=.402), which suggests that other things – perhaps the nature of coalition government 
and/or the proportion of new MPs within an intake – are also important for explaining turnover patterns. On the 
former, Keith Vaz, formerly Chair of the Home Affairs SC, stated “I suspect the second biggest factor [after the election 
of chairs] leading to change in select committees has been the coalition government” (quoted in Fisher 2015, p.424).. 
Future research, perhaps undertaken at the end of the current Parliament when more data is available, could explore 
such an effect but data included in the series from the post-coalition session in 2015-2016 does not give grounds for 
modifying the analysis provided here, or for positing a coalition effect.  
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6. Discussion 
We find no evidence that MPs were more engaged or involved in SCs following the Wright reforms 
than they were beforehand. A secondary finding of this paper is that one of the Wright 
recommendations relating to the number of committees was not implemented. There were no 
changes to the Standing Orders by the then Labour Government in relation to the number of SCs, 
nor even an explicit response to the Wright Committee’s recommendation of a decrease. The 
powers of Government to control the number of committees are mitigated somewhat by external 
factors – for example public and political pressure regarding ethics and parliamentary conduct, 
equality, and public engagement have led to the creation of new committees. For its part, the HoC 
must track changes to the architecture of government such as the creation of new departments, by 
creating new SCs, as seen in the aftermath of the recent EU membership referendum which resulted 
in the creation of two new departments with two new shadowing SCs. Yet whatever the pressures 
faced, it is certainly the case that subsequent Governments have not utilised their power to limit the 
number of DAOS SCs; indeed, although not statistically significant, the number of DAOS SCs has 
increased post-2010. With regard the number of sub-committees, which is entirely under the remit 
of SC members themselves, MPs have not taken the opportunity to, or – perhaps more accurately – 
been able to, ration the ‘scarce resource’ of their time and commitment, as endorsed by the Wright 
Committee by reducing the number of SC sub-committees 
 
The more significant finding of the study is that there appears to be no change in MPs engagement 
with SCs post-Wright. Despite the failure to implement a reduction in the number of committees, it 
might still be expected that attendance would be seen to increase and turnover decrease post-2010, 
especially given the implementation of the other main recommendations, the praise that has 
generally been directed towards the Wright Reforms in increasing the prestige of SCs and their 
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ownership among MPs, and the emphasis placed on creating alternative parliamentary career paths 
both within the Wright Report and elsewhere. However, we find no evidence that this rise in status 
has produced any greater willingness on the part of MPs to attend SCs since the Wright reforms 
were enacted. The ‘carrots’ of the claimed rise in status of SC work due, in part, to the introduction 
of elections, and the reduction in departmental SC size have not affected rates of attendance; nor 
has the ‘stick’ of the use, or the threat of the use15, of the mechanism by which members with what 
is deemed to be a poor attendance record are discharged and replaced. Similarly, an increased 
emphasis on ownership and alternative career paths has not lead to a decrease in turnover rates16.  
 
Yet, despite what some may argue about the Wright Reforms, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
changes introduced in 2010 made little, if any, difference to these measures of membership 
engagement. MPs are subject to various competing demands on their time and committee work is 
only one aspect of their job. The wider architecture of party and government in British 
parliamentary politics sets the parameters around what parliamentarians can do, and the Wright 
Reforms could only ever modify this at the margins.  As discussed below, there are thus numerous 
factors that militate against transformative change in the operation of the SC system and 
engagement with it17.  
                                                          
15 Until the end of the 2010 Parliament, the mechanism has not been used at all (Liaison Committee, 2015, p.33). 
16 Our future research will explore the destinations of SC leavers and the impact of SC membership on parliamentary 
careers. 
17 Moreover, it is arguable that the recommendations that were implemented were not as far-reaching or successful as 
intended. For instance, the 2010 changes to the Standing Orders regarding committee size did not have any catalytic, 
indirect impact on committee size for other non-departmental Wright Committees: the Environmental Audit Committee 
continues to have 16 members; the size of the Standards Committee rose to 15 by the end of the 2010 Parliament; and, 
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There is no evidence the mechanism of electoral competition has any impact on raising attendance 
and increasing ownership as intended. There is also reason to doubt that the mere fact of the new 
election system helps to  produce higher quality committee chairs. The pool of candidates for any 
committee chair is restricted by two factors. First, since Select Committees are Parliamentary 
institutions that seek to scrutinise and hold government to account, the chair must be a 
backbencher. With the expansion of the payroll vote in recent years, this reduces the pool of 
candidates from 650 to around 410. Second, committee chair positions are divided up among the 
parliamentary parties in rough proportion to their levels of electoral support and with government 
having a large say in which committee chairs they retain. For Labour or Conservative-chaired 
committees, therefore, the pool of candidates is around 150-200 for each of 27 posts, meaning that 
competition is rather less fierce than it might initially appear. Of the 57 positions filled using the 
Wright system up to time of writing (26 in 2010, 27 in 2015 and 4 by-elections, with some MPs 
winning more than once), 20 were elected unopposed as the only candidate. 13 of the 47 elected 
chairs had also previously served as Select Committee chairs under the old, unelected system.  It is 
difficult to imagine how this alone could produce a transformative impact on the ownership and 
operation of committees. The evidence that the chairs who are selected by this process are any 
different to the type of parliamentarian who previously occupied committee chairs in the 
unreformed system is also minimal to non-existent. There is only very weak evidence that elected 
chairs are more independent-minded or unbiddable than their predecessors or in comparison to 
backbenchers as a whole, that they supply ‘new blood’ to the system, or that they are opting for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
although the size of the Procedure and the Public Accounts Committees fell from 13 to 12 and from 16 to 14 after the 
2010 general election respectively, they rose back to 13 and 15 respectively after the 2015 election. 
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committee chairs as a deliberate choice as an alternative parliamentary career path and to forego the 
ministerial greasy pole (Goodwin, Bates et al. 2016). 
 
Furthermore, Select Committee work continues to be only one aspect of parliamentary work that is 
competitive, and often incompatible with, many other responsibilities and roles such as constituency 
case work, scrutiny of legislation, contributing to debates, working with external stakeholders or 
pursuing governmental preferment. In their 2013 report, the Political & Constitutional Reform SC 
stated that ‘[T]he demands on Members are now such that select committees sometimes find it hard 
to fill vacancies so that they can maintain their numbers and consequently their effectiveness’ (p.11). 
Although this point is related specifically to vacancies, it is also apposite here in that these demands 
would almost inevitably affect attendance rates also. The Liaison Committee note the clashes that 
sometimes arise between members’ SC work and their placement on long-running public bill 
committees or on delegated legislation committees (2013, p.16), while the increasing use of 
electronic communications in recent years has vastly increased the volume of correspondence 
received by MPs and consequently their workload. The Liaison Committee also reports that 
Government or Shadow Cabinet appointments, even at junior levels, remain more attractive than 
Committee work (2013, p.16), which helps ensures that turnover rates remain high since many MPs 
will opt to relinquish their SC roles in order to participate in government, no matter how minor the 
role. 
 
7. Conclusion 
It is important to note that some of the claimed benefits of the Wright reforms regarding SCs are 
neither tangible, nor amenable to measurement with the data we have gathered here, and we are 
certainly not arguing that the Wright Reforms were either unnecessary or have failed. However, with 
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the evidence available to us now, the results are clear: one key recommendation concerning 
decreasing the number of SCs has not yet been implemented, and the overall Wright Reforms had 
little, if any, impact on attendance and turnover rates of SC membership.  
 
These results, then, might give us pause for thought about some of the more effusive praise for both 
SCs and the impact of the Wright Reforms; the reforms may not have been implemented and may 
not have worked as comprehensively as some people have concluded, at least in some aspects of the 
SC system – attendance rates, ownership, career pathways – identified by both the Wright 
Committee and others as important. The results might also cause us to think about why the Wright 
Reforms did not have their intended effects in the areas considered here despite the aims of the 
Wright Committee and the clear will of the HoC.   
 
Such thinking has already started to take place in Parliament and beyond. For instance, in addition to 
the Wright Report, the case to rationalise the number of SCs has also been made by the Liaison 
Committee, due to concerns ‘that increased responsibilities, and more and larger committees may 
result in the perverse outcome of an overall decrease in the quality of Parliament’s scrutiny of 
government’ (2010, pp.9-10). The Liaison Committee also reported, in a section concerned with SC 
attendance, that the number and size of SCs remained an issue (2015, p.35). Although recognising 
the importance of the issue of access for smaller parties to SCs, and despite government’s seemingly 
continued resistance to the idea (Political and Constitutional Reform Committee 2013, p.2), the 
Committee argued, “It may be time to contemplate the possibility that each committee itself does 
not have to mirror the exact party composition of the House” (2015, p.35), perhaps especially so 
given the reported problems of the inability of SCs to reach quoracy and to fill vacancies even with 
the help of the Whips (Political and Constitutional Reform Committee 2013, p.11).  
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Although relatively minor, these further reforms would have the effect of spreading MPs less thinly 
across the Committee system and might thus increase the time MPs have for Committee work, at 
the same time as making Chair and membership elections more competitive and encouraging 
members to be more engaged and involved. In such ways, the aims of the Wright Committee 
regarding membership engagement have a better chance of being more fully realised, even without 
broader changes to parliamentary architecture regarding party and executive dominance. More 
broadly, our findings suggest that, if Select Committees seek to entrench their growing significance 
in future, they should start to do so by avoiding complacency in assuming that the Wright reforms 
are a sufficiently powerful mechanism to drive improvement on their own.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of Domestic/Administrative & Other Scrutiny Select Committees and Number of Select Sub-
Committees, 1979-2016 
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Figure 2: Average Attendance Rates for Departmental Select Committees, 1979-2016 
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Figure 3: Weighted Turnover for Wright Select Committees Membership, 1979-2016 
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Tables 
Table 1: Model Description & Statistics for each Time Series 
Series Model Number of 
Predictors 
R-Squared Q Statistic 
Number (Total Sub) (1, 1, 0) 3 .104 Q = 22.376; df =17; p<.171 
Number (DAOS) (1, 1, 0) 3 .014 Q = 21.536; df =17; p<.203 
Attendance (1, 1, 0) 4 .787 Q = 21.444; df = 17; p< .207 
Weighted Turnover (1, 0, 0) 5 .405 Q = 14.787; df = 17; p< .611 
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Table 2: ARIMA Model Parameters for each Time Series 
Dependent variable Independent 
variables 
Estimate SE t Sig. 
Number of 
Domestic/ 
Administrative & 
Other Scrutiny 
Committees 
Constant .061 .621 .098 .923 
AR(1) -.076 .191 -.396 .695 
Difference 1    
Time .008 .033 .235 .816 
PrePost 2.860 18.199 .157 .876 
Interact -.076 .535 -.142 .888 
     
Number of Sub-
Committees 
Constant .031 1.178 .026 .979 
AR(1) -.318 .174 -1.828 .077 
Difference 1    
Time -.004 .063 -.056 .956 
PrePost 15.593 36.339 .374 .711 
Interact -.407 1.068 -.381 .706 
      
Attendance Constant -1.857 1.113 -1.668 .109 
 AR(1) -.477 .184 -2.599 .016 
 Difference 1    
 Time -.057 .069 -.828 .416 
 PrePost 30.047 23.823 1.261 .220 
 Interact -.995 .851 -1.170 .254 
 Start 10.781 1.511 7.137 .000* 
      
Weighted Turnover Constant 35.721 4.648 7.685 .000 
 AR(1) -.001 .191 -.003 .998 
 Time -.063 .233 -.270 .789 
 PrePost 200.317 125.584 1.594 .122 
 Interact -5.522 3.697 -1.494 .146 
 Start -14.494 4.737 -3.060 .005* 
 End -13.863 4.939 -2.807 .009* 
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